IV. Costs and Benefits of CLEAR

The terms "costs" and "benefits" are interchangeable depending on whether one is examining the effect of crime or the effectiveness of a crime reduction program.
- Cohen, 1999

T his section presents a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the CLEAR program. The purpose is to examine the hypothesis that program costs are offset by monetary and non-monetary benefits to individuals, communities and society. The focus is on monetary costs of the program and those associated with any reductions in gang crime.

Budget limitations restricted the extent of the cost analyses that could be conducted within the scope of this evaluation. To conduct the analysis, readily available crime and expenditure data for CLEAR and current published estimates of cost of crime were organized within a conceptual framework and analytic procedures that draw heavily on recent work by Mark Cohen and others.[1]

A description of the model and presentation of cost-benefit estimates for CLEAR are followed by a discussion of this application and comments on the potential value of investing in a more incisive cost-benefit analysis of the CLEAR program.

A. The Cost-Benefit Conceptual Model for CLEAR

This is a cost-*benefit* as opposed to cost-*effectiveness* study of CLEAR. That is, benefits as well as costs are estimated in monetary units, in this case as the cost savings due to crime reduction as opposed to, e.g., the number of crimes reduced. The basic definitions and assumptions of the CLEAR cost-benefit model can be stated as follows:

(1) CLEAR program costs are expenditures for program activities during the study period. Basic program costs for CLEAR are the grant funds expended by the program for the sites and periods under consideration. A number of assumptions underlie our understanding of "true costs" of the CLEAR program:

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[1] Personal communication and Cohen, 1999.

(a) Costs are considered for either operations (e.g., Operations Team personnel), support (e.g., coordination by the DA's office) or complementary components (e.g., the Unsolved Homicide Team). These distinctions may be important in considering the cost of replicating (Section V) or sustaining (Section VI) the CLEAR program.

(b) CLEAR may not appreciably increase the *overall* costs of participating departments (e.g., no new personnel may be hired department-wide). On the other hand, such shifts in resources are "opportunity costs" that benefit CLEAR at the expense of other deployments. An earlier report concluded that "in-kind" contributions of core agencies – e.g., supplementing LAPD CLEAR officers with LAPD CRASH officers – effectively doubled the value (cost) of the CLEAR program during Phase I.[2] This issue is discussed at the end of this section.

(c) The marginal value of added costs of investigation, prosecution and corrections can be significant, e.g., if longer prison time is obtained for a large number of CLEAR convictions. This issue is discussed at the end of this section.

(d) Costs must at least be incurred, if not actually invoiced or paid, within the study period. Because of unavailable information about the time costs were incurred, many costs have been estimated from grant, invoice or payment dates.

(e) The primary focus of this analysis is on the two longest-operating CLEAR sites: Northeast and Foothill. Northeast has been in operation since early 1997; Foothill, since early 1998. Pacific, which has been in operation since late 1998, is also examined but Wilshire, which saw only about 6 months of operation, is not. Sites that are Phase III only – Devonshire, Newton and Century, which joined other continuing sites in April 1999 – are excluded.

(f) The study period for this report is April 1997 through September 1999, covering Phases I and II of the CLEAR program. Phase I (Northeast only), began full operations in April 1997 and Phase II (3 sites) was originally anticipated to last only one year, from April 1998 through March 1999. However, because AB 853 expenditures and the LA County Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) expenditures have extended past their original grant periods, the cost-benefit analysis has included in Phase II the full 18-month program period between April 1998 and September 1999 (see Attachment 1). This overlaps the beginning of Phase III, which officially started in April 1999.

(2) CLEAR program benefits are, most generally, the value of the program to those with a legitimate investment in the program's outcomes.

(a) Benefits may accrue to CLEAR's funding entities, program agencies, residents, taxpayers, crime victims and others. All identifiable beneficiaries are of interest to this study. This excludes, of course, certain gang or other community members with an interest in program failure.

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[2] From the original Case Study (January 1998). CRASH is the LAPD's pre-existing anti-gang unit.

(b) Reduced criminal victimization by gang members is a core benefit desired by CLEAR, and one that can be expressed in monetary terms. This is the focal measure of benefit for this study.

(c) CLEAR's ultimate objective is to enhance the quality of life in targeted neighborhoods, a benefit that is both complex and, in its more psychological elements, cannot be measured adequately in dollars.

(d) A critical organizational benefit to the CLEAR model is the development of inter-departmental collaborations – at policy and operational levels – that are expected to add efficiency (e.g., better jail intelligence) and effectiveness (e.g., percentage of successful prosecutions) to the work of the departments acting independently.

(e) In addition, the establishment of collaborative ties among law enforcement, community members, local public and private institutions and gang prevention/intervention programs – a form of "social capital" creation – that are *sustainable* beyond CLEAR funding periods is viewed by CLEAR's executive committee as a benefit that is integral to ongoing community safety and quality of life.

B. The Cost and Benefit Data

Data available from CLEAR's core agencies were used for both the cost and benefit components of this study. For example, invoices were used to estimate program costs for different agencies and categories. As already noted, a number of decisions were made about what constitutes appropriate or feasible data.

(1) **CLEAR program cost data**

The estimated costs for each of the three Phase I and II sites are shown in Attachments 10 and 11, and summarized below. Total costs equal the combined funding of COPS for Phase I (Northeast only), AB 853 and the two LLEBG grants allocated among the three Phase II sites. Costs are estimated for operations, support (including technical assistance, county-wide software and evaluation) and complementary functions (primarily the LASD Unsolved Homicide Investigation Team). These cost estimates can be summarized as follows:

Table IV.1. Estimated Program Costs, CLEAR Phases I and II,
April 1997–September 1999 (in thousands)

	Operations (calculated)	Support (pro-rated)	Complementary (pro-rated)	Total	Annualized Cost*
Northeast (I and II)	$1,008	$573	$400	$1,981	$897
Foothill (II)	$411	$221	$100	$732	$593
Pacific (II)	$418	$221	$100	$739	$844
Total Phases I & II	$1,837	$1,015	$600	$3,452	
Phase III to 9/99[3]	$224	$16	$74	$314	
TOTAL ALL PHASES	**$2,061**	**$1,031**	**$674**	**$3,766**	

* All phases (Phase III prorated). Operational periods: NE, 10 quarters; Foothill, 6 quarters; Pacific, 4 quarters.

The largest differences in these estimates are of course between Northeast, which participated in Phase I, and the other two sites, which did not. Pacific operations costs are estimated to be somewhat higher than Foothill, even given its shorter duration as a site, due largely to higher staffing and facility costs. In-kind contributions, mentioned earlier, might effectively double the operations costs to over $4 million. On the other hand, perhaps as much as 10-20% of the cost of operations can be considered to have been consumed by the typical unavoidable inefficiencies of startup. Most of such startup costs might be incurred in the replication of CLEAR to other sites (although some of CLEAR's learning experiences can also be transferred), but would not be incurred in continuation at current sites.

The above analysis considers only direct program costs – those that are directly related to grant expenditures. Other costs to the agencies involved, or to other components of the criminal justice system are discussed at the end of this section.

(2) Benefit data (see Attachment 9.f)

A large group of benefits are based on changes in the incidence of different types of crime, before CLEAR versus during CLEAR, and their associated monetized values. **Tangible** costs involve monetary payments such as medical bills, the value of stolen property, wages lost and the cost of law enforcement. **Intangible** costs are "nonmonetary" and include estimates for fear, pain, suffering and lost quality of life. Both are given

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[3] Expenditures for Phase III are first reported for July 1999. Specific breakouts by site are not available at this time.

monetary estimates associated with different categories of crime (see Cohen, 1999). These

can be summarized as follows:

Tabel IV.2. Monetized Benefits (Costs per Victimization)

Category	Tangible	Intangible	Total Cost
Assault	$1,753	$8,822	$10,575
Arson	$22,055	$20,358	$42,413
Rape	$5,768	$92,063	$97,832
Robbery	$2,601	$6,447	$9,048
Carjacking	$5,485	$6,447	$11,932
Murder	$1,164,930	$2,160,210	$3,325,140
Kidnapping	$7,804	$28,275	$36,079

*1998 dollars

C. Cost-Benefit Findings and Interpretation

As opposed to the estimates in the previous section, this section presents estimates of

changes in crime that use controlled statistical regression procedures.[4] Although this

procedure is best suited for a higher quality and volume (noted below) of data, it at least

provides conservative findings and a model for data analysis that may be more applicable for

CLEAR and similar programs in the future.

Estimates of Changes in Gang Crime[5]

Any analysis of program effectiveness must control for factors beyond the control of the

program. Obviously, many factors affect the gang crime rate in the CLEAR program and

comparison areas. It is not feasible to model all of those factors – especially with only 23

quarters worth of data. Instead, it is assumed that the external factors affecting gang related

crime in the targeted areas are also pertinent in the nearby areas. Thus, the "balance" areas

(total LAPD area minus CLEAR target areas) are used to "control" for these external factors.

Indeed, although gang related crime appears to be declining in the targeted areas during

the time of the CLEAR program, it also declined during that time period in other areas of Los

Angeles. Thus, the measure of program effectiveness could be thought of as any *excess*

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[4] Regression estimates of crime reduction are included here, as opposed to in the previous section, because they are
so integral to the estimation of cost savings.

crime reduction in the target areas from the trend observed in the nearby areas. Of course, this is an assumption that might not be true. If there are other reasons why gang related crime might change at differential rates, then, if feasible, these factors should also be taken into account.

Linear regression models were used to take into account simultaneously more than one factor. The dependent variable is the quarterly reported gang crime rate in the target area(s), and independent variables were specified as: (1) quarterly gang crime rate in the balance of the LAPD district, (2) seasonal dummy variables,[6] and (3) a dummy variable indicating whether or not the CLEAR program was in place during that quarter. Thus, we control for external factors such as secular (general) trends in the crime rate and seasonal (same quarter each year) variations. In the regression equation, the coefficient on the CLEAR program variable indicates whether or not gang related crime went down in the target (primary or secondary area) while controlling for these other factors.

Findings from the Regression Analysis

Generally, the analysis reveals a small negative effect on the crime rate; in other words, crime goes down during the implementation of the CLEAR program. However, using raw crime data (see Attachment 9.f.2), this negative effect is not "statistically significant" at the traditional 95% confidence level. For example, the estimated crime reduction in the Northeast sector is -3.4 crimes per quarter. However, when a 95% confidence interval is constructed around that estimate (i.e., if this study were replicated 100 times, it would show that the point estimate falls within this range 95 out of 100 times), that interval is from –9.7 to +2.8. In other words, within this level of probability, there is no certainty that CLEAR is found to reduce crime.

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[5] The basic content of this section, and related analyses, were contributed by Mark Cohen. Edits, elaborations, contextual information and final interpretations were done by Lodestar.
[6] A dummy variable (i.e., coded "1" and "0" to represent presence and absence of a condition) is used to represent "seasons" (each quarter of the year) for the prediction of raw crime data; it is not needed for predicting the one-year moving averages, which cover all seasons.

Using the same analysis on one-year moving averages (Attachment Table 9.a) to help smooth-out erratic trends, a more positive result – more crime reduction – emerges for Northeast and Pacific, but not for Foothill, as shown below (taken from Attachment 9.f.2):

Table IV.3(a). Estimated Reduction in Gang Crimes, Northeast CLEAR (10 quarters)

		Point Estimate	Lower Estimate[a]	Upper Estimate[a]
Primary Area Only	Raw data	-34	-97	+28
	Moving Average	-30	-58	-3
Primary and Secondary	Raw data	-16	-115	+84
	Moving Average	-49	-74	-24

[a] Using a 95% confidence level. Primary and combined area estimates significant for moving averages only.

Table IV.3(b). Estimated Reduction in Gang Crimes, Foothill CLEAR (6 quarters)

		Point Estimate	Lower Estimate[b]	Upper Estimate[b]
Primary Area Only	Raw data	-4	-45	+38
	Moving Average	+3	-22	+27
Primary and Secondary	Raw data	-23	-81	+35
	Moving Average	+2	-28	+32

[b] Using a 95% confidence level. No statistically significant estimates for either analysis.

Table IV.3(c). Estimated Reduction in Gang Crimes, Pacific CLEAR (4 quarters)

		Point Estimate	Lower Estimate[c]	Upper Estimate[c]
Primary Area Only	Raw data	-9	-47	+30
	Moving Average	-24	-46	-1
Primary and Secondary	Raw data	-23	-63	+18
	Moving Average	-29	-50	-8

[c] Using a 95% confidence level. Primary and combined area estimates significant for moving averages only.

As can be seen in Tables IV.3(a) and IV.3(c), the moving average estimates are statistically significant (at the 95% confidence interval) for the Northeast and Pacific sites.

Further Notes on the Procedure

The results of a regression analysis depend on many factors, some of which can affect the level of effect and significance detected. As seen here, this is true of the choice of a one-year moving average versus raw data as the dependent variable: the program variable is better able to predict the moving average. The moving average is considered the better choice because it provides for at least partial smoothing of erratic changes in crime data from quarter to quarter, some of which is attributable to reporting error or unique events. The choice of a one-year moving average was somewhat arbitrary, but it accomplished taking the "seasons" out of the dependent variable without consuming too much data (as, for example, a 5-year average would do). Averages of other lengths were not analyzed.

Another choice was to use crime data going back to early 1994 – not earlier, not more recent – in order to provide a sufficiently long period of pre-program time, particularly for the oldest CLEAR site, Northeast. Other cut-off dates could yield different results. There were also choices made in options available in the statistical package (SPSS) used to run the regression model. Essentially, lacking a theoretical base to do otherwise (e.g., to employ step-wise regression), the most common statistical analysis options were selected.

Again, interpretation of these initial data is complicated. One complicating factor that cannot be controlled for in the analysis is the fact that part of the effect of the CLEAR program might be to *detect* gang-related crime that might not otherwise be detected. This increased detection might come about because reporting goes up when there are more visible police and probation officers. It might also be the case that crimes are now identified as being gang-related more often since there is more in depth investigation to determine whether a gang was involved.

Thus, even if the CLEAR program has a significant effect in reducing *actual* gang related crimes, it might have the offsetting effect of increasing the number of *detected* gang related crimes. Ironically, CLEAR's success at imposing more gang conditions of probation leads to an actual increase in the number of gang arrests made. For all these reasons, any estimates of program effectiveness are likely to understate the benefits of the CLEAR program.

Estimates for Monetary Benefits

For this report, the crime reduction benefits of the CLEAR program have been translated into monetary benefits. This was done by first estimating the "average cost" of a gang-related crime for LAPD gang-related crime data (see the table on page 39). To estimate the average cost, all crimes were added up by type during the reference time period (1994-1999) and each was multiplied by its cost (see Attachment 9.f.1). The costs were taken primarily from Miller, Cohen and Wiersema (1996), which estimates both the tangible (out of pocket) costs such as medical costs and wage losses, and the intangible costs such as pain, suffering and lost quality of life. Tangible and intangible costs have been reported separately. All costs were updated to 1998 dollars by the consumer price index.

All crimes except kidnapping and carjacking were available from the previously mentioned source. In the case of kidnapping, the most recent data available comes from Cohen (1988). Those figures have also been updated based on the information compiled in the newer study by Miller, Cohen and Wiersema (1996). In the case of carjacking, the closest crimes in either source were "motor vehicle theft" and "robbery." Since motor vehicle theft does not involve an occupant, the two categories were combined. Property losses (which are on average higher for motor vehicle thefts than for assaults) were taken from motor vehicle thefts. However, all other categories of costs were taken from robberies, since they also involve a victim who is directly threatened.

Attachment Table 9.f.2 presents estimated costs of gang crime for the CLEAR program, based on cost data (Table 9.f.1), regression estimates and both raw gang crime data and one-year moving averages for the CLEAR and surrounding areas (Attachment 9.a). These estimated cost *reductions* – or *benefits* – are strongest for the moving average data, which show cost reductions for Northeast and Pacific CLEAR, but not for Foothill CLEAR. Northeast and Pacific moving-average benefits from Table 9.f.2 are reproduced in the following table:

Table IV.4. Estimated Benefit from Gang Crime Reduction: Northeast and Pacific CLEAR*
(Data from Quarter 2, 1994 through Quarter 3, 1999)

Site	Target area	Mean (predicted value)	High Estimate** (most benefit)	Low Estimate** (least benefit)
Northeast	Primary only	$3,198,714	$6,100,781	$306,148
	Combined area	$5,192,895	$7,815,207	$2,570,584
Pacific	Primary only	$2,501,964	$4,862,890	$141,039
	Combined area	$3,045,851	$5,240,401	$851,301

*Based on one-year moving averages; program period is 10 quarters for Northeast, 4 for Pacific. Combined area includes primary and secondary target areas.
** 95% confidence interval.

The general conclusion from these data is that Northeast CLEAR has reduced total gang victimization costs anywhere from approximately $300,000 to over $7.8 million over its 10 quarters of operation, with the average estimate being $3-5 million, depending on whether only the primary target area or primary plus secondary areas are considered. That compares with perhaps just over $2 million in direct plus in-kind program costs associated with Northeast CLEAR (see page 38), a large portion of which was incurred during Phase I.

Pacific CLEAR is estimated to have reduced these total costs by between somewhat less than $150,000 to approximately $5.2 million, with the average estimate being $2.5-3 million, depending again on how narrowly the target area is defined. The program costs of Pacific CLEAR are probably less than $1 million over this one-year period of operations.

D. Discussion

As noted earlier in this section, this analysis of program costs and monetary benefits is considered to be a conservative exercise with a relatively sophisticated tool. That is, because of data quality and quantity issues, the multivariate regression procedure is likely to produce *under*estimates of both the extent and statistical significance of changes in gang crime – and, therefore, benefits. Where credible positive differences are found using this procedure – such as for moving averages for Northeast CLEAR – they are most likely greater than the model can demonstrate.

At the same time, Cohen points out (1999) that there are many unresolved issues in this type of analysis, in terms of both theory and application. Theoretical issues include defining costs and types of cost, and specifying who bears them. These are not straightforward or even value-free considerations.

Methodological issues have to do with alternative ways to set monetary values on tangible and intangible costs. Procedures, and estimates, vary widely and much hinges on not only the data limitations but on the appropriateness of the procedure for answering the appropriate questions about type of cost and to whom. The cost of crime estimates used in this report include costs to victims and to agencies providing services to victims, which leave a number of other costs to other entities unexplored.

Costs Not Accounted For

As mentioned earlier, this report does not have data for at least two important cost areas: 1) the "opportunity costs" to others of non-grant resources brought into CLEAR, and 2) the "marginal costs" that CLEAR produces in the criminal justice system. The extent to which the CLEAR program takes resources from other law enforcement efforts – as opposed to supplementing them – is probably not substantial, given the amount of grant funding to CLEAR for salaries and equipment. To the contrary, CLEAR may on occasion and in certain circumstances actually *increase* resources to other efforts. This may happen, for example, when the LAPD's anti-gang CRASH officers are not needed because CLEAR officers are there,[7] or when Deputy Probation Officers, themselves with smaller, targeted case loads, relieve cases from non-CLEAR DPOs. Even rough monetary estimates of opportunity cost trade-offs are not possible within the scope of this study, but will be pursued somewhat further under the continuing evaluation of CLEAR.

Estimating marginal costs to the larger criminal justice system presents similarly daunting challenges. Data on costs incurred in prosecuting, convicting, sanctioning and incarcerating gang crime perpetrators because of CLEAR – minus *savings* from the absence

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[7] It is not possible to weigh this against the considerable in-kind support also given CLEAR by CRASH.

of the same activities due to gang crime *reduced* by CLEAR – are simply not available and could not be compiled within the scope of this evaluation.

However, the type of analysis that could be done can be illustrated using felony conviction data from CLEAR and borrowing estimated costs of felony conviction from another jurisdiction. Attachment 9.g shows seven homicides resulting in convictions by CLEAR District Attorneys (6 for Northeast; 1 for Foothill). Steve Aos and his colleagues at the Washington State Institute for Public Policy estimate the total costs of law enforcement, prosecution, incarceration and supervision for a homicide by an adult in Washington state to be close to $150 thousand (Aos, 1999). That estimate applied to CLEAR convictions produces a criminal justice cost of just over $1 million.

Estimates for the cost to the criminal justice system for other crimes tend to be much smaller (e.g., about half as much for aggravated assault). Nonetheless, if similar cost estimates were available for California – and they were credible enough – they could be used as part of a procedure for estimating the cost and cost savings of CLEAR.[8]

Benefits Not Accounted For

Two of the areas pointed out by Cohen (1999) where the analysis of monetary costs and benefits needs more work – and both areas are critical to the study of CLEAR – are: 1) improved estimates of the crime control *benefits* of incarceration and 2) improved measures of community wellness.

Monetary measures of the benefits of incarceration (a component of criminal justice system *costs*) to society are needed to adjust measures of their cost. A criminal removed from society is at least temporarily not inflicting additional costs on victims or society. Recent works by Aos, et al. (1999), Caulkins, et al. (1999) illustrate the use of a number of quantitative adjustments in the calculation of costs. These studies employ highly sophisticated formulas to turn simple calculations, such as the ones used here, into cost figures that control statistically for a number of additional factors. As indicated in the title of Caulkins' book, *An Ounce of Prevention, A Pound of Uncertainty*, this is not a totally

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[8] The Washington State model is far more complex than the illustration used here.

fulfilling task, relying on a sobering number of assumptions about the quality of data and about the model itself. Such endeavors, and those of Cohen (1999) and Greenwood (1998), are leading the way for analytic procedures that may benefit projects such as CLEAR as longer-term and more adequate measures become feasible.

Measures of community wellness, or quality of life, are a category of intangible benefits that represent the CLEAR program's ultimate goal: to "recover" gang-infested neighborhoods for normal community activity. Because recovery is a longer-term prospect, some quantitative measures of wellness, such as property values, are not reasonable for this point in time. Particularly difficult are monetized measures for community perceptions of safety, connectedness and quality of life. Indicators of public disorder – graffiti, public drunkenness, etc. – are potentially measurable but, again, not easily in monetary terms.

Another important expected benefit for CLEAR – and, again, one difficult to monetize – is the creation of effective, institutionalized collaborations across departmental lines, and a strengthening of focus by the participating departments individually. Vertical prosecution, the dedication of efforts to working cross-agency for the duration of a case through the many steps from early investigation through case conclusion, is a hallmark of CLEAR. Higher conviction rates for CLEAR City Attorneys – from 73% (Pacific) to 97% (Northeast) – are one indication of the effects of vertical prosecution.[9] Acknowledging that this success feeds the system *cost* of CLEAR, it also illustrates a modeling of more efficient systems that, without monetizing, must be considered a significant potential CLEAR legacy.

A Tentative Conclusion and Exploration

The simple conclusion from this analysis of costs and benefits is that CLEAR is more beneficial, at least monetarily, in the longer term. Modest evidence to that effect is seen in the findings for Northeast CLEAR versus, in particular, the newer Phase II site in Foothill. (Pacific is also "successful" in terms of crime cost, but has only 4 quarters of data to substantiate this conclusion.) Given this finding, does that mean that Foothill, as the second site phased in, was not successful? Or is it still too early to tell?

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[9] City-wide comparison rates were not available but are known to be considerable smaller.

Simple, quantitative, hypothesis-testing conclusions cannot be fully definitive. There is too much indication – quantitative and qualitative – of cost *and* benefit that had to be left unexplored and that begs for better data and additional analysis.[10] Some of that additional analysis has already begun, including alternative data analyses.

For example, one of the concerns with the regression analysis of the Foothill data is that the comparison area is not a sufficiently adequate "comparison group" in the quasi-experimental model sense.[11] This concern is supported by the finding that the correlation of pre-program gang crime trends between the target and balance areas is not significant for the Foothill data (it is for the other two sites), pointing out one logical "matching" criterion that is not met. To provide an alternative test, another comparison area was constructed for Foothill by aggregating data from the 10 Reporting Districts that immediately surround the target (primary plus secondary) areas, which might improve the social and cultural similarities between target and comparison – arguably at least as important as similar crime patterns.

The result was that pre-program correlations of target and comparison gang crime data were still not significant, and neither were estimates of changes in target area gang crime. However, predictions were now in the direction of target area crime *reduction*, and closer to an acceptable level of significance ($p = .137$). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study to continue to try to construct better comparison areas (a difficult task because a number of factors, some unmeasurable like history and profile of gang activity, would need to be matched). The quantitative estimation of crime reduction – a core element in estimating costs and benefits – is sensitive to a number of decisions about data, none of which are straightforward.

Nonetheless, these analytic procedures can add considerable value to the evaluation of programs like CLEAR. As these three CLEAR program sites continue to operate over time – and as the data analyses and assessments of the community become more refined – the monetary impact of CLEAR should become more understandable.

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[10] The continuing CLEAR evaluation will afford some additional exploration of these issues.
[11] The "balance of area" is used in this report as much for consistent descriptive as for analytic comparison.